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NEW DIMENSIONS IN SEALIFT

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEITH S. KELLY, USA

(Why should a strategic mobility
capability be retained as a key ingredient
in our national strategy? What part will
our sealift capability play in major
deployment and support operations in
the next decade?)

The Nixon Doctrine stresses a low profile
for the United States abroad and enjoins
foreign governments to provide the manpower
for their own defense. This same doctrine,
however, emphasizes that the United States
will meet its treaty commitments to its allies.
At some time in the future, we again may find
it necessary to assist a threatened ally with
American
military
forces.
It seems
appropriate, therefore, that a strategic
mobility capability be retained as a key
ingredient in our national strategy.
Strategic mobility involves a combination
of two elements. On the one hand there are
the forces in being which must be maintained
in a high state of readiness in the event they
must be introduced in an oversea area. On the
other hand there is the need for timely and
efficient transportation, both in the initial
movement of forces to an area of crisis, and
later when providing the support necessary
for sustained combat operations.
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In the decade ahead, one can anticipate the
full exploitation of air transportation to meet
both initial deployment and follow-on
support requirements. The Military Airlift
Command with its C141 and C5 aircraft,
augmented in time of emergency by a growing
commercial aircraft fleet, provides a
significant mobility capability. Nevertheless,
sealift will continue to play a significant, and
even predominant, role in major deployment
and support operations. Cost factors,
configuration of cargo, and aircraft capability
and availability all indicate that this will be
so. The extensive role and vital need for
sealift is illustrated by our experience in
Vietnam. At no time during the peak United
States involvement in Southeast Asia did
airlift account for more than four percent of
the total cargo moved to the war zone.1
At present, there are three primary sources
of sealift available to meet strategic mobility
requirements. Two of these sources, the
vessels of the Military Sealift Command and
the National Defense Reserve Fleet, appear to
be destined for a lesser role in any future
conflict. Congressional disapproval of new
and efficient Multi-Purpose ships for the
Military Sealift Command reduces the chances
for a substantially modernized or enlarged
sealift fleet dedicated to military needs. The
present National Defense Reserve Fleet,
consisting of ships built during World War II,
will be scrapped before the end of this
decade. Thus, the remaining source, United
States commercial shipping, will be the
principal source of sealift for meeting
strategic mobility requirements in support of
military operations in the years ahead.
The current deplorable state of the United
States merchant marine is well known.
American ships are generally old and only
marginally competitive in world commerce.
Fortunately, the outlook for the maritime
industry is not completely hopeless. In
October 1970, the Congress approved a major

and innovative in logistical operations is based
on the rapid and direct movement of supplies
and equipment from CONUS depots to units
overseas. Here the goal of the logistician is to
provide more responsive support and to
reduce both the amount of stock and number
of supply echelons in oversea areas. These
direct delivery concepts are tied to the
movement of materiel in containers.
Typically, the containers used are the size of
the trailers commonly seen on the nation's
highways; however, the chassis can be
detached from the container to permit
compact
loading
aboard
ship.
Forward-thinking logistical planners envision
the container as the unifying bond
throughout the entire supply distribution
system. Thus, the use and handling of
containers must be integrated into logistical
planning for the support of combat forces
during future contingency operations.

new program aimed at revitalizing the United
States merchant marine. This program is
designed to provide up to 300 modern new
merchant ships over the next 10 years. From
the viewpoint of the military planner, it is
significant to note that most American ship
owners interested in obtaining dry cargo
vessels under the new maritime program are
planning to build specialized ships capable of
carrying cargo in barges or containers. In fact,
all of the commercial dry cargo ships now
under construction in domestic shipyards are
either barge or container carriers.2 These
ships are designed to make a profit in
international maritime trade and not t o move
military cargo per se. The introduction of
these specialized ships into the commercial
fleet raises two fundamental and related
questions for the military planner. First, are
they suitable in terms of design and operation
for strategic mobility requirements? Second,
given the fact that these modern specialized
ships will be available, is the Army capable of
employing them effectively in a strategic
mobility role?

BARGE AND CONTAINER SHIPS

What are the characteristics and capabilities
of the modern specialized ships and their
usefulness in meeting military requirements?

DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

The US Army is a mobile army. In a typical
unit, the number, weight, and size of the
vehicles and aircraft to be deployed are
among the critical factors and challenges in
strategic mobility planning. In the initial
deployment
phase of a contingency
operation, in which a significant portion of
the cargo to be moved will normally consist
of vehicles and aircraft, the requirement is for
a ship with large unobstructed deck spaces,
preferably with internal ramps or elevators,
heavy lift gear or a drive-on, drive-off
capability.
The
development
of
Roll-On/Roll-Off ships and the use of small
aircraft carriers to ferry Army aircraft
overseas reflect the requirement for these
vessel capabilities.
Provisions for the follow-on logistical
support required to sustain combat operations
also pose challenges for the strategic mobility
planner. Today, new concepts are being
studied and applied in the logistical support
of Army forces overseas. Much of what is new

LIGHTER ABOARD SHIP VESSELS

The lighter aboard ship vessels (LASH) are
essentially powered hulls designed to carry
floating barges which can be loaded or
unloaded without the use of fixed port
facilities. The barges are loaded and
discharged over the stern of the vessel by
means of an installed gantry crane. The crane
is designed to handle the barges on a
15-minute cycle. Each barge is of standard
design and dimensions, with a capacity of up
to 415 tons of cargo-large enough to
accommodate nearly all the tracked and
wheeled vehicles in the Army inventory. The
barges can also accommodate the UH-1 series
helicopter
with minimum disassembly;
however, movement of larger helicopters
would require considerable prior disassembly
due to the height of the barges. The LASH
system is patented and owned by LASH
3
Systems, Inc.
The barges are not
self-propelled; a tugboat is required to move
62

U S ARMY

The Sea Barge (SEABEE) is well suited for moving both vehicles and aircraft.
them between the ship and wharves or piers
where they can be loaded or discharged. The
big advantage of the LASH ships is that they
need not remain in port while the barges are
being filled or emptied. A ship can discharge
and reload an entire complement of barges in
a matter of hours and be on its way again.
This is in sharp contrast to the several days
normally required t o load or discharge a
conventional cargo ship.
With the LASH system, the barges are
stacked one upon the other up to six high.
The ship itself has only one deck level. This
single deck is a definite limitation when
considering other uses for the ship. For
example, the LASH vessel would not be an
efficient or economical carrier in a
conventional Roll-On/Roll-Off mode. LASH
ships are also being designed to carry a
combination load of barges and conventional
trailer-sized containers. A second and smaller
gantry crane is provided on the ship to handle

the container portion of the load. Loading
and discharging these containers, of course,
requires that the ship come alongside a pier or
that it operate with lighterage capable of
moving the containers to or from the ship and
the shore.
THE SEA BARGE

The Sea Barge (SEABEE) is another version
of the barge ship. Such vessels are being built
by General Dynamics Corporation for the
Lykes Brothers Steamship Company. The
barges used with the SEABEE ships are larger
than those used aboard the LASH vessels;
they have a rated capacity of 930 tons. 4 This
increased size provides a potential for better
use of available space when carrying loads of
vehicles and aircraft. As is the case with the
LASH barges, SEABEE barge height
limitations restrict effective use in moving
helicopters larger than the UH-1 series.
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The most significant difference between
the SEABEE and LASH ships is that the
SEABEE has three deck levels. Also, the
barges carried on SEABEE ships are loaded
and unloaded by an elevator at the stern of
the vessel rather than by a gantry crane. The
SEABEE ships do not have a special crane
designed t o handle trailer-sized containers
similar to the one on the LASH ships. On
SEABEE vessels, containers are carried either
inside the barges or in trays on the open deck.
This requires use of special materials handling
and stacking equipment.5 The SEABEE ships
offer great potential for use in a regular
Roll-On/Roll-Off mode; i.e., using the vessel
to carry vehicles and aircraft on its decks
rather than inside barges. The total space
available on the ship's three decks compares
very favorably with the Roll-On/Roll-Off
capacity of the highly regarded ADMIRAL
CALLAGHAN now in service between the
East Coast and Europe.
CONTAINERSHIPS

Ships designed t o carry trailer-sized
containers have been in service for nearly 15
years, and their impact on international
shipping and the maritime industry has been
growing steadily. The first containerships
were self-sustaining; the special cranes
required t o move the containers between ship
and pier were an integral part of the vessels.
As the use of containers and special
containerships
has
expanded,
nonself-sustaining containerships have come
to dominate the industry. Both the major
containership companies and the major world
ports involved in containership trade are
building, or have already built, elaborate
shore complexes with pier-side cranes and
marshalling
areas
to
support
the
nonself-sustaining vessels. The military
planner must be concerned with the use of
these ships since they do require highly
specialized support facilities.
Planners must also face the fact that the
containership operators have not standardized
the dimensions of their containers. Generally,
the containers in common use today are
about 8 feet wide and 8 feet high, but they
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vary in length from 20 to 40 feet. Two of the
largest domestic containership operating
companies use containers which are 24 and 35
feet in length-sizes offering the least
potential for standardization. This variation in
container lengths limits the possible
interchange of support equipment and
facilities.
THE ROLE OF SPECIALIZED SHIPS I N
MILITARY OPERATIONS

In meeting sealift requirements for initial
deployments, one can largely rule out a role
for a ship capable of carrying only
trailer-sized containers, since they cannot
accommodate any but the smallest vehicles.
Equally important, the containership is not
well suited for moving unit impedimenta or
accompanying supplies. In moving this type
of cargo, maintaining a high degree of
integrity with the unit's vehicles and/or
aircraft is essential. If containers of unit
equipment and accompanying supplies were
consolidated to obtain a reasonably full
shipload, the cargo most likely would not be
at the right place at the right time.
The LASH type vessel offers considerably
more potential for unit deployments. The
LASH barges can accommodate a variety of
wheeled and tracked vehicles, and the
container capability of these vessels provides
an option for conveniently moving other
impedimenta and supplies along with the
unit's major items of equipment. The ship's
barge handling capability also offers an
excellent potential for efficient multi-port
loading and discharge. Finally, the LASH ship
has the integral small gantry crane for
handling trailer-sized containers of follow-on
supplies and is not dependent on special port
equipment for unstowing the containers on
board.
The LASH vessels, however, do appear to
have significant limitations in supporting the
initial deployment of typical combat units.
The LASH ship, with its single deck, is not an
efficient vehicle carrier in a Roll-On/Roll-Off
mode. The loading of vehicles inside the
barges will result in considerable lost space
(broken stowage) despite the planner's best

efforts to tailor loads to the space available.
Equally important is the very real problem of
removing heavy vehicles from the barges at
primitive ports or stretches of open beach.
The 20-ton cranes organic to the present
Army Terminal Service Company are not
adequate to lift tanks, self-propelled artillery
pieces, or engineer construction equipment. A
floating crane, of course, could do the job-if
one were available. In a rapid deployment
situation, a floating crane towed from the
United States by a slow tug might not arrive
in the objective area in time to meet
contingency plans and deployment schedules.
A possible solution to the problem would be
to mount a suitable heavy lift gantry crane on
a modified LASH barge. This modified barge
could then be moved to the discharge site on
the first trip of a LASH type ship and
perform heavy lift functions throughout the
deployment operation.
The SEABEE vessel is better suited t o
support the initial deployment of military
units. As already mentioned, the SEABEE
ship is well suited for use in a
Roll-On/Roll-Off
mode.
As
a
Roll-On/Roll-Off vessel, the SEABEE would
prove satisfactory even in a primitive port or
beach environment, if it could "marry-up" its
stern ramp with a firm surface leading to the
shore. This same type of intermediate transfer
operation would be required under similar
conditions with any Roll-On/Roll-Off ocean
going vessel. A ship-to-shore transfer of
vehicles could
be accomplished
by
constructing a causeway using barges and
equipment carried aboard the SEABEE. In
other situations, the use of beach lighters,
such as the Army's JOHN U D PAGE, would
be desirable for the ship-to-shore transfer of
vehicles. However, the planner is faced with
the problem of having vessels like the JOHN
U D PAGE positioned in the objective area in
time to function effectively during the initial
deployment phase of a contingency
operation. In concluding an analysis of
SEABEE vessel capabilities, two points should
be made-one is a useful capability and the
other is a limitation. On the plus side, the top
deck of the SEABEE is suitable for carrying
helicopters without any disassembly. Also,

the stern elevator is designed to permit
helicopter rotowash t o pass through; this
makes it possible for helicopters to operate
from the ship.6 On the negative side, the
SEABEE vessel does not have an installed
gantry crane; therefore, outside assistance
would be required for over-the-side transfer of
conventional trailer-sized containers.
A few general comments are in order on
the use of barge ships, either the LASH or
SEABEE, in support of military operations.
One limitation on the use of barges in the
early stages of a rapid deployment situation is
that some means of power is required to move
them from the ship to the point where they
are to be unloaded. A small tugboat, if
available, would be adequate. Also, as one
analyst has suggested, barges intended for use
in areas lacking suitable port facilities could
be equipped with outboard motors to move
them short distances.7 Another factor t o be
considered is the effect of weather on
scheduled unloading operations in unsheltered
areas. The contingency planner must be
prepared to cope with those operational
limitations imposed by severe sea conditions.
In adverse weather, it is possible that barge
discharge activity could be slowed or even
halted completely.
FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The remaining factor to be considered in
analyzing the role of specialized vessels in
meeting strategic mobility requirements is
their capability for providing follow-on
logistical support to the deployed forces.
The barge ships have been highly touted as
a panacea for military cargo movements. Do
they, in fact, offer an answer to tomorrow's
requirements and concepts for resupplying
forces overseas? Both the SEABEE and LASH
vessels compare favorably in terms of speed
with the conventional break-bulk cargo ships
in use today. Also, they compare most
favorably in the amount of cargo carried per
ship. In terms of loading and unloading time,
the barge ships can be turned around in a
matter of hours; however, the extraction of
cargo from individual barges would probably
be at a slower rate than the discharge of cargo
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capability of new containerships is even more
impressive. Considering an average capacity of
10 tons per 20 foot container, a new vessel
now under construction can lift as much as
22,940 tons of cargo.8 Modern containerships
have one limitation that overshadows all the
advantages which can be listed-they require
external support to operate in primitive ports
or to deliver cargo across a beach. From a
military viewpoint, there is a need for an
interface between the fast containership and
the forces operating in a land environment
away from modern fixed port facilities. There
are two parts to this necessary interface: first,
the containers must be discharged from the
ship and placed ashore; and second, a means
must be provided for moving them inland to
the final destination.
The f i s t part of the problem is the more
complex and difficult t o solve. One means of
discharging nonself-sustaining containerships,
of course, is to build and install the necessary
piers and cranes in the objective area. This
was done at Cam Ranh Bay in 1966 to
support operations in Vietnam. While this
might be considered the ultimate solution, it
is not acceptable in a rapid deployment
situation where a means of discharging
containerships might well be required in a
matter of days. A second alternative would be
to plan on using a containership interchange
point at a modern, highly developed port
outside but near the area of conflict.
Nonself-sustaining containerships could be
routed to this port, and the containers could
be transhipped to final destination in either
the older and smaller self-sustaining
containerships or in other types of
ocean-going vessels. This offers some potential
in localized contingency situations; however,
over-reliance on this alternative in the future
would be inadvisable. Arrangements to permit
support of United States military operations
elsewhere would have to be made with
countries having the necessary container
handling facilities. In many cases, these
arrangements would be politically difficult; at
the least, they might be time-consuming.
Also, the distance between CONUS ports, the
interchange port and the area being supported
might well degrade timely follow-on support

from a hatch on a conventional ship. The use
of barges and barge ships does have an
additional dimension in terms of potential use
in a support role during contingency
operations. The barges could be used for the
accumulation and storage of prepositioned
stocks. Government owned or leased barges
capable of being moved by either LASH or
SEABEE vessels could be pre-stocked and
held in readiness for pick-up by a mother ship
for emergency movement to any destination
worldwide. A somewhat related potential use
for the barges would be to employ them as
semi-permanent floating storage points in the
rear of a combat zone. Employing them in
th i s role would reduce both the immediate
and long-range need for shore-based facilities
and would free critical construction resources
for other requirements.
The use of barges is only minimally
compatible with direct delivery concepts. A
barge provides a consolidated entity for the
documentation and control of a block of
cargo; barges also lend themselves to
multi-port discharge and enroute diversion
without
extensive
cargo
rehandling.
Nevertheless, the barge is not the answer to
the concept of direct delivery of supplies
from CONUS to units deployed overseas. The
barge fails this test because, in nearly every
case, the cargo must be loaded and unloaded
at a port and moved onward to its destination
by other modes of transportation. This
deficiency could be overcome by loading
trailer-sized containers in the barges so that
direct inland delivery of containerized lots of
cargo could be accomplished by rail, highway,
or air transportation. The efficient use of
containers in this manner, however, would
require adequate heavy lift shore-side or
floating cranes suitably prepositioned in the
objective area.
Containerships appear to offer the best
means of providing responsive follow-up
support to deployed forces. As was pointed
out earlier, containers are already the focal
point of new supply distribution and
transportation concepts and systems. Like the
LASH and SEABEE vessels, the new
containerships are much faster than typical
conventional cargo vessels. The cargo carrying
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The Beach Discharge Lighter PAGE receiving vehicles in open water from a Roll-On/Roll-Offship.
The PAGE is the only ship o f its type in the Army's inventory.

for the deployed forces. Finally, in any
widespread conflict situation, the fixed port
facilities at the interchange port would be
vulnerable t o enemy action.
A third alternative might be to discharge
and reload containerships with heavy-lift
helicopters. This concept appears to be
technically feasible. In 1967, American
Export
Isbrandtsen
Lines
conducted
experiments using a commercial version of the
CH-54 helicopter and achieved a discharge
rate of six containers an hour under relatively
adverse weather conditions. 9 The Military
Sealift Command and the Army have also
conducted studies and tests on container
discharge by helicopter. Currently, however,
there is no helicopter available which is
capable of lifting a fully loaded container.
The development of such an aircraft is just
getting underway. Rapid and efficient
containership discharge by helicopter is a

concept and not a capability available for use
in the short-range future.
A f i n a l alternative for discharging
nonself-sustaining containerships involves the
use of a floating gantry crane to remove the
containers from the vessel so they can be
deposited either on a pier or into lighterage
for further movement t o the shore. The
inherent value and potential of containership
support is lost, however, if a high rate of
container discharge cannot be achieved. The
floating cranes now in the Army's inventory
are very slow and
such
operations. A discharge rate of 6 containers
per hour would be quite good with
cranes, whereas a sustained discharge rate of
up to 30 containers per hour would be
r e q u i r e d f o r reasonably efficient
containership operations. Although a special
floating port facility that could provide
adequate crane service has been designed, its
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cost is estimated at $60,000, and thus is
clearly not cost feasible. A more practical
solution is needed. One proposal which has
been offered is to modify old tankers or ore
ships by installing modern high speed gantry
cranes capable of loading and unloading
containerships efficiently. These ships could
be brought alongside the nonself-sustaining
containerships to move the containers into
lighterage or onto piers and wharves as
required.10 Several of the ships could be
completely modified and maintained in a
ready-for-sailing status; these modified ships
would appear to be cost competitive with
potential helicopter discharge systems. With
proper planning, the modified ships could be
scheduled into any possible contingency area
in time to handle containerships when they
first arrived.
In situations where floating equipment
might be used to discharge containers from
ships into lighterage, the lighterage used
should be of a type which would permit the
container to be placed directly on a chassis as
it is removed from the ship, thus precluding a
second lifting operation when the container
reached the shore. Beach discharge lighters
larger than the JOHN U D PAGE with an
unobstructed deck space wide enough to
permit tractors and trailers to maneuver
freely, would greatly facilitate rapid and
efficient movement of the containers. Two or
three of these vessels could work with one
containership and maintain a very acceptable
discharge rate.
The second part of the containership
interface problem, moving the containers
inland to their ultimate destination, appears
to be less difficult to solve. In any major
contingency operation, initial deployment
plans could include provisions for the delivery
of container chassis and motive power to the
objective area in advance of, or concurrently
with, the arrival of the first containership.
The containers could then be moved inland to
combat and support units as needed.
Unfortunately, there is one consideration
which complicates this aspect of a direct
delivery system-indeed, one which may come
to haunt military planners in future rapid
deployment situations. This is the variation in
68

container lengths. It is entirely possible that
several types and sizes of chassis would be
required to support a large scale containership
operation.
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR SPECIALIZED SHIPS

Achieving acceptable cargo discharge rates
with barge ships and containerships during
contingency operations will require adequate
cargo handling equipment as well as personnel
properly organized and trained in its use. For
example, the increased use of containers will
result in large numbers of these trailer-sized
boxes accumulating at ports and beach
discharge sites. Containers will be held
t e m p o r a r i l y a f t e r arrival waiting
transportation for onward movement. Empty
containers will be returned to port areas and
accumulated for back-loading on ships
returning to the United States. Adequate
marshalling areas will be required in the
vicinity of every site served by containerships.
The size of these marshalling areas would be
minimized, thereby saving construction time
and effort, if the containers could be stacked
one upon the other. A wide variety of lifting
devices has been designed to support similar
commercial container handling requirements.
These very necessary devices are not in the
Anny's inventory, so they are not now
available to support strategic mobility
requirements. Of equal importance, rapid and
efficient cargo handling away from major
ports can only be achieved if properly trained
and equipped units are on site and ready to
function; port operating units should be in
being and ready to respond to any
contingency.
CONCLUSIONS

The two questions posed at the beginning
of this article were: First, are the specialized
ships suitable in terms of design and operation
for strategic mobility requirements? Second,
is the military capable of employing these
ships effectively in a strategic mobility role?
In determining the answer to the first
question, it is necessary to divide military
requirements into two parts, because different

The answer to the second question, the
capability of the Army to employ the new
s h i p s effectively, is considerably less
favorable. A number of problem areas have
been surfaced. An ability to project military
land power and to support this power in areas
without sophisticated port facilities is
fundamental to an acceptable strategic
mobility posture. The speed and cargo
carrying capacity of the specialized ships is
not an asset unless the ships can be discharged
rapidly and efficiently wherever and whenever
a contingency situation exists. To a very large
degree, the Army currently lacks this
capability. The problems associated with
attaining acceptable discharge rates in
undeveloped areas are not insurmountable,
but they do require additional study,
experimentation, and above all, resources.
Modern high speed floating cranes are
required to work with the specialized ships;
both barge-mounted cranes and specially
designed crane ships are practical and feasible.
The needed types should be added to the
Army's equipment inventory. Each of the
new ships draws in excess of 30 feet of water.
This limits their ability to operate in minor
ports and to approach beach discharge sites.
Modern lighterage capable of providing the
interface between the specialized ships and
the shore is essential. Beach discharge lighters
of the JOHN U D PAGE class, but larger, are
n e e d e d t o s u p p o r t nonself-sustaining
c o n t a i n e r s h i p s a n d Roll-On/Roll-Off
operations in situations where piers or
causeways are not available. The use of
helicopters to discharge barges and to move
containers from ship to shore, or even further
inland, offers considerable potential. Both
helicopter capabilities and the techniques for
t h e i r employment require further
experimentation and development.
Other problem areas also require attention
before the answer to the second question can
be answered affirmatively. The current
variations in container sizes will be an
albatross around the neck of military planners
in the future. This lack of standardization
limits needed flexibility in loading ships and
may require that several different sized chassis
be available in an oversea area. The equipment

ship characteristics are desirable for unit
deployment and follow-up support operation.
A ship used in the initial unit deployment
phase of a contingency operation must be
capable of efficiently handling large numbers
of vehicles and contribute to maintaining unit
integrity. On the other hand, new concepts in
follow-up support require a ship that
facilitates the through movement of cargo and
its delivery direct from CONUS t o deployed
units.
The new specialized commercial ships have
certain characteristics which are favorable to
b o t h u n i t d e p l o y m e n t and support
operations. In every case, they are faster and
have a greater cargo carrying capacity than
most conventional dry cargo ships now in
service; thus, they can provide timely support.
Considering the different types of specialized
ships, the SEABEE vessel, with its excellent
Roll-On/Roll-Off capability, is best suited for
unit deployments. The LASH ship can also be
used for unit deployments, but it is somewhat
less desirable than the SEABEE. The
containership is relatively useless for unit
deployments since it cannot carry any but the
smallest sized military vehicles.
I n the follow-up support role, the
characteristics of the ships produce a different
order of utility. The containership provides a
capability for unitizing cargo. Moreover,
containerization is clearly the trend in future
logistical support concepts. The LASH ship
can carry containers, so it also has utility in
the support role. While the SEABEE ship can
carry containers, major internal adaptations
and support equipment are required. SEABEE
and LASH barges are not compatible with
future through movement support concepts
unless they are filled with conventional
containers. The barges, however, do provide a
means of prepositioning and storing reserve
stocks in areas of possible future need. The
LASH barge is perhaps best for this purpose
since it can be carried aboard both LASH and
SEA BEE vessels.
On balance, then, the answer to the first
question is a qualified yes. The new
specialized commercial ships can meet
strategic mobility requirements providing
they are used in the proper role.
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currently authorized in military port units
also requires scrutiny. Modern lighterage,
c r a n e s a n d o t h e r materials handling
equipment are needed if the full potential of
modern specialized ships is t o be realized.
It is essential that we recognize that these
modern specialized ships will be the backbone
of our future commercial fleet. When these
ships are used in the proper role and phase of
an operation, when the proper units and
equipment are available to handle their cargo,
they will enhance our strategic mobility
posture.
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